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none lost the quarter's crédit; 17 students were suspended for
varying lengths of time, but with the entire suspension suspended; 4 students are on indefinite suspension for failure to
report to a Disciplinary Committee.
"In addition, the Disciplinary Committees reached the following décisions: 1 student was fined the cost of a broken
w i n d o w but given no other sanction; 3 students were put on
disciplinary probation for varying lengths of time, but with
no suspension involved; 28 students were recommended for no
disciplinary action; 10 students had charges dropped in their
cases for either mistaken identity or insufficient évidence.
"Both Disciplinary Committees based their individual décisions on the extent and degree of the student's involvement in
the disruptive incident or incidents for participation in which
he was s u m m o n e d to the Committee, the nature of the student's response to the summons, and, in some cases at least, the
student's previous record of disciplinary involvement or lack
of it during his time at the University.
"As for appeals to the Dean of Students for mitigation of

the Disciplinary Committees' judgments, 33 students hâve filed
written appeals as of April 7. O f thèse, 19 appeals hâve been
acted on, and 14—most of which hâve been received only in
récent days—are pending.
"Of the 19 appeals on which I hâve acted, ail from suspended students, the disciplinary judgments imposed b y the
Committees ranged from a one-quarter suspension to an indefinite suspension. In the cases of five of thèse appeals, I did
not act to mitigate the Committees' décisions. In 14 cases, action of some kind was taken to mitigate the effects of the
original judgments. In one case, an indefinite suspension was
set aside completely. In three cases, a one-quarter suspension
was suspended. In three cases, one quarter of a two-quarter
suspension was suspended. In one case, a four-quarter suspension was reduced to three, and in another, afive-quartersuspension was reduced to three. Finally, in five cases, administrative actions were taken which, although they did not formally change the penalties imposed by the faculty committees,
substantially mitigated their conséquences.
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FREEDOM FROM COERCION
PhilC. Neal
W e convene today, b y ancient custom, to reaffirm cherished
values and renew our c o m m o n purpose. T h e conf erring of degrees is an act of witnessing tô the sovereign cause that explains and justifies the university: the enlargement of the individual. T h e degrees to be awarded hère signify knowledge
acquired, tasks done, commitments made. But also and most
of ail they represent the bénédiction of the University, and
the hope that each in his o w n w a y has found hère some hint
of a wider vision, some glimpse of the path to self-knowledge
that will help him find fulfillment and set him free.
This should also be an occasion of mutual bénédiction—a
Phil C. Neal, Professor and Dean of The University of Chicago Law School, delivered thèse remarks at the Winter Convocation, 21 March 1969, at Rockefeller Mémorial Chapel.

m o m e n t in which those w h o join in giving and receiving degrees, and ail w h o share in the enterprise of self-fulfillment
that is the university, m a y bestow upon the enterprise itself
the thoughtful appréciation that gives it life and strength. T h e
university is not to be taken for granted. M u c h of h u m a n history, and not merely the récent events across our country and
in other parts of the world, should remind us that the idea of
the university is never secure. It exists only as part of the
precarious flux of man's long quest to realize more fully the
security, freedom and dignity of the individual life. It thus behooves us to understand the conditions that m a k e it possible
and the currents of thought in society that m a y undermine
those conditions.
It is in this spirit that I should like to consider briefly the
problem of coercion, a problem that appears to be crucial to-
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day for law and society as well as for the universities. M y suggestion is that deeper values are involved than what is ordinarily suggestëd b y the well-worn phrase "law and order,"
and that a society must be on guard that those values are not
equated with the mère absence of force and violence. A certain confusion and even ambivalence toward coercion in its
less violent but no less malignant forms can be seen as one of
the ominous attitudes of our time. If so, it is not for want of
humanity or sensitivity. T h e reverse is true. Intolérance of
evil is a mark of advancing society. T h e evils about us are ail
too manifest, and hâve been mad e more so by the aroused
consciences of a younger génération. It is that very sensitivity
to great wrongs—war, racial injustice, hunger, oppression—
that has mad e more acute the ancient dilemma of ends and
means. It is at such times that the commitment of a society to
the legitimacy of means is put to the severest test. O u r présent
condition has brought into question, perhaps not for the first
time in our history but on a wider front than before, our
attachment to freedom from coercion as afirstprinciple of a
humane society.
It might atfirstseem surprising that an idea as fundamental
as freedom from coercion is not enshrined in the rhetoric of
liberty, along with the great phrases of the Bill of Rights—
freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, freed o m of assembly and of pétition. T h e answer, of course, is
that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were addressed to
a différent problem. T h e y were framed to guard against the
excesses of officiai authority, not to préserve the freedom of
m e n against the private conduct of f ellow men. T h e Founders
were able to take for granted that protection against private
coercion, against the imposition of one man's arbitrary will
upon another, had been the chief business and the great accomplishment of the c o m m o n law. T h e y assumed a social
structure in which coercion was acknowledged to be the
monopoly of the state, and the problem set for them by their
o w n récent history was to fashion ways in which that monopoly could be m a d e strong and permanent, yet consistent with
the freedom of its beneficiaries. Checks against arbitrary officiai power was their task. D u e process of law was the historié
symbol of that objective, and the spécifie freedoms of the Bill
of Rights identified the values that expérience suggestëd were
likely to be the first victims of unchecked governmental
power.
Thus the principle of freedom from private coercion cornes
d o w n to us without the benefit of a grand crystallizing phrase
48
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or document. Rather it is the sum of our légal development,
the accretion of centuries of graduai working out of rights
and duties that m a y give each m a n a secure universe of his
o w n personality. Beginning with protection against crude and
violent inflictions, such as murder, assault, theft, the forcible
dispossession of the tenant from his land, the law came slowly
to recognize more subtle and less palpable invasions. T h e
security of the individual was widened to include protection
against defamation, déception, blackmail, the négligent infliction of bodily harm, the intentional interférence with" contractual relationships. T h e development continues in our o w n
time, partly because of ever-widening conceptions of the
essentials of h u m a n dignity, partly because the ingenuity of
m a n in devising affronts to that dignity constantly outruns thé
légal system's définitions and machinery. T h u s in our o w n day
w e hâve seen the necessity for a whole séries of n e w fédéral
laws and enforcement procédures to protect the black citizen,
not merely against unjust laws, but against coercion, threats,
and intimidation by private individuals and groups through
practices associated with the hateful symbol of the K u Klux
Klan.
A n e w phenomenon that has only begun to confront the
law, but àppears likéfy to do so with increasing insistence, is
the coercion that m a y be implicit in or m a y be generated by
organized démonstration and protest. T h e problem is difficult
for the law and for the society, and for m a n y reasons. Foremost is the désire to préserve m a x i m u m room for emphatic
and effective political expression. T h e use of public places as a
forum for such expression is b y n o w a deeply ingraine d part
of our tradition. A good deal of inconvenience and discomfort
is to be tolerated in support of that tradition. Moreover, it is
not easy to define the coercive circumstances or to separate
them from legitimate expression. There is a danger of overkill, as through loosely drafted laws that place undue reliance
on the discrétion of officiais or the instant judgment pf the
police. T h e most obvious social evil to be averted is that of
violence, but there is the countervailing fear of evoking violence through an appearance of suppression. There is the additional difficulty of technique in crowd control and the maintenance of police discipline. Finally, apart from the danger of
harms to persons or property, it is not clear that there is niuch
to be feàred from the overtones of coercion inrtiàssprotest.
O u r courts, législatures, and electorates are not thought to be
highly vulnérable to intimidation. T h e y are not easy targets.
Thus m a n y factors hâve tended to produce an attitude of

restraint and tolérance on the part of the law, as well as m a n y
thoughtful m e n , toward tactics that often suggest a purpose to
impose one group's will upon its fellow m e n . T h e attitude is
reinforced by the évident justice of m a n y of the ends for
which such tactics hâve been invoked. Sympathy for those
ends, and an acknowledgment that the rirotest has at times
been effective, hâve thus given some legitimacy to means that
would otherwise seçm doubtful because of their implicit
threat or actual effects upon the rights of others. T h e ambivalence is most clearly illustrated, perhaps, by the Suprême
Court's unwillingness to vindicate the law of trespass as
against the sit-ins protesting racial discrimination at lunch
counters in the South. That particular issue was fortunately
resolved b y n e w civil rights législation, but the Court's o w n
irrésolution symbolizes, and perhaps has encouraged, the uncertainty with which our society faces the larger question of
coercion.
T h e universities are n o w in the forefront of that larger
question. For them the problem is both more immédiate in its
impact and more difficult of solution than for the society at
large. It must be m a d e clear w h y ambivalence on this issue is
more dangerous for a university than for the society as a
whole, and w h y its attitude must be uncompromising. T h e
issue for a university is not merely violence, nor disruption
and inconvenience, nor the préservation of civilities in the
relations a m o n g m e n . Thèse are proper concerns of the university, as of the society about it. But the university's deepest
concern is to préserve itself as the place in society that sets the
highest value upon the integrity and freedom of the individual.
If freedom from coercion is an aspiration of society, it is the
essence of the university. T h e university coerces no one into
its membership, it imposes no views. It off ers to ail w h o qualify the opportunity to seek their o w n self-fulfillment through
knowledge, to f o r m their o w n view of the world. It exacts no
allegiance, except to the principle that ail others w h o make up
the community shall enjoy a like freedom.
Such a society is vulnérable to illegitimate pressures in ways
that the larger community is not. It is vulnérable because
great costs can easily be imposed—costs not only in wasted
resources, alienated support, time spent, and opportunities lost,
but the grievous losses of m o m e n t u m and spirit that nearly ail
w h o hâve been at this university during the past quarter must
hâve felt. There is perhaps' no great danger that men's views
will in fact be coerced, that the pursuit of truth will be côrrupted or. the university's aims be altered. T h e greater danger

is that m e n and women—students and faculty alike—who prize
the atmosphère of freedom that is a university will be driven
to seek that freedom in other places and other ways, and thus
by érosion rather than visible catastrophe the institution will
languish.
T h e university is also vulnérable because its défenses are
weak, and because of its unique relationship to the law of the
larger community. T h e university does not possess or share
the coercive power that belongs to the civil authority. Yet it
cannot, except at great risk to its o w n values, f ully receive the
protection of that authority. It is in important ways a law
unto itself, yet without law. This is in part because of the very
difficulties and inadequacies the external community has experienced in dealing with the phenomena of protest and coercion, and because of the violence that lurks in provocative
nonviolence. Yet it is also because in a deep sensé law is alien
to the spirit of thé university, whether in the form of external
authority or internai rules. T h e university aims at a higher
code of freedom and mutual restraint than the imperfect
mechanism of law can provide. A university, like a home,
which must fall back upon law to regulate the conduct of its
members has already lost its noblest quality.
A n d so the university must remain vulnérable and fragile. It
cannot become a government; it cannot lightly turn for aid
to external force. In setting the example of a community free
from coercion, it must appeal to spirit and motive, those intangibles of conduct that no law can successfully detect or
regulate. In the extrême, it must invoke that other cornerstone
of liberty recognized by our law,, the freedom of association.
Président Levi has rightly said that the university belongs to
no one. It does not follow that it belongs to everyone. It exists
for, it must be reserved for, those w h o are prepared to renounce not only force and the threat of forcé but the idea of
coercion itself as a means of making their views prevail. Such
a community is not closed to change, for it is open to the
power of reason. But in such a community it will also be
recognized that where m e n are uncoerced différences of view
will often persist, and the withholding of assent will not be
stigmatized as a refusai to listen. T h e perpétuation of that
spirit is both a necessary condition and the essential mission of
the university.
In troubled times, past and présent, this University has held
true to its o w n ways and to the idéal of the inquiring, uncoerced mind. T h e power of that idéal and the strength of its
o w n spirit will sustain it.
•
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